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Summary
Our environment offers us a number of opportunities for
action. However, sometimes we also have to refrain from
acting, for example, when facing a ‘‘do not touch’’ sign
placed over a desirable object on the shelf of a shop. Previ-
ous findings emphasized the role of mesial frontal and
prefrontal regions in the inhibition of stimulus-driven motor
responses [1–3], leading to the prediction that motor areas
should not become active when one inhibits a motor
response. Nevertheless, refraining from performing a spe-
cific action might require one to internally represent what
one is not doing. Is the motor system simply inhibited in
this condition, or does it play an active role in the represen-
tation of the withheld action? Here, we show that while the
majority of macaque ventral premotor neurons remain silent
when themonkey refrains fromgraspinganobject, others, re-
corded simultaneouslywith the former, discharge bothwhen
the monkey grasps an object (‘‘action’’) and when it refrains
from doing so (‘‘inaction’’). The same effect has been shown
to be present for mirror neurons [4]. Some of them, besides
discharging during action observation, also fire when the
observed agent refrains from acting. Notably, neurons dis-
charging during inaction specifically encode either the mon-
key’s own or other’s inaction, not both. Our findings indicate
that ventral premotor cortex encodes representations of our
own or others’ action not only when we perform or observe
that action but also when its negation is represented.
Results and Discussion
We recorded grasping neurons from ventral premotor area F5
(Figure 1A) of two macaque monkeys when they performed a
go/no-go task (‘‘execution task’’) and when they observed an
experimenter performing the same task (‘‘observation task’’).
Both tasks included two main conditions (Figure 1B; see also
Figure S1 and Supplemental Experimental Procedures avail-
able online). In the first one, the agent (monkey or experi-
menter) was required to grasp a target object (‘‘action’’); in
the other one, the agent had to remain still for the entire dura-
tion of the trial (‘‘inaction’’). In both conditions, the temporal
sequence of events was the same and the monkey was
required to maintain fixation. The trial started when the mon-
key, in complete darkness, placed its hand contralateral to
the recorded hemisphere in a starting position. A fixation point
was then presented. As soon as the monkey engaged fixation,*Correspondence: luca.bonini@unipr.ita cue sound instructed the agent (monkey or experimenter) to
grasp (‘‘high tone’’) or not to grasp (‘‘low tone’’) the subse-
quently presented target. One among three different graspable
objects was then randomly presented (target presentation).
When the cue sound ceased (go/no-go signal), the agent had
to either reach, grasp, and pull the object (within 1.2 s from
the sound off), in the case of the action condition, or remain still
until the end of the trial (1.2 s), in the case of the inaction
condition. At the end of correctly performed trials of both con-
ditions, themonkeywas automatically rewardedwith a drop of
juice.
After several months of training, both monkeys performed
the various trials of the execution task with a high rate of suc-
cess (86.1%). The analysis of the type and frequency of errors
the monkeys made indicated that they tended to erroneously
reach to grasp the target object more frequently prior to the
go (‘‘false start’’) rather than the no-go signal. However, false
starts also occurred after the no-go signal (see Figure S2
and Supplemental Results), indicating that the mere ceasing
of the sound (even when it was the low tone) could induce
themonkey to act. This suggests that the correct performance
of the inaction condition in the execution task required volun-
tary inhibition of the reaching-grasping action.
We recorded 663 area F5 grasping neurons, all tested during
both execution and observation tasks. All neurons discharged
during action execution. Among them, 188 also fired during
action observation and were therefore classified as mirror
neurons. Surprisingly, some of the recorded neurons (n =
105) also became active during the inaction condition relative
to both baseline and the object presentation epoch (see Table
S1). Some of them (26 out of 105) were motor (nonmirror) neu-
rons and discharged exclusively during the inaction condition
of the execution task. An example is shown in Figure 2A.
Neuron 1 is a motor neuron that, besides discharging when
the monkey grasped the object (blue), also responded when
the monkey refrained from doing so (red). This neuron did
not discharge during the observation task. The remaining
(79 out of 105) were mirror neurons, and most of them
(42 out of 79) discharged exclusively during the inaction condi-
tion of the observation task. For example, neuron 2 shown in
Figure 2A responded not only during grasping execution and
observation but also when the monkey observed the experi-
menter refraining from grasping the object. Notably, this
neuron did not respond in the inaction condition during the
execution task. Note that the inaction conditionwas character-
ized by the same cue signals and reward contingencies in both
task contexts (execution and observation). Figure 2B shows
that, with few exceptions (n = 7), the neurons encoding
inaction responded significantly more strongly (p < 0.05) in
one of the two tasks, namely, execution (n = 45, light and
dark yellow bars) or observation (n = 53, light and dark blue
bars). Importantly, most of them encoded inaction exclusively
in one of the two tasks (36 out of 45 execution; 42 out of 53
observation).
This behavior is also clear at the population level (Figures 2C
and 2D; see also Supplemental Results). It is noteworthy that
all neurons responding to inaction during the observation
task (Figure 2D) were mirror neurons, while the great majority
Figure 1. Recorded Region and Behavioral Paradigm
(A) Lateral view of the right hemisphere of the monkey brain. The orange shaded region indicates the sector of the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) from
which recordings were carried out. As, arcuate sulcus; Cs, central sulcus; IPs, intraparietal sulcus; Ls, lateral sulcus; Ps, principal sulcus.
(B) Schematic representation of the sequence of events in the action and inaction conditions of the task. Note that the sequence of events was the same
when the task was performed by the monkey (execution) as when the task was performed by the experimenter (observation). Task execution and obser-
vation were run in different blocks, while action and inaction conditions were randomly presented within each block. Monkeys’ arms were not constrained
in either of the two contexts.
See also Figure S1.
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1612(26 out of 36) of those responding to inaction in the execution
task (Figure 2C) did not show any significant response to ac-
tion observation (see also Table S1).
It might be claimed that neuronal responses during inaction
condition could be accounted for by some kind of reward-
related anticipatory signal or, alternatively, by subtle, unno-
ticed monkey movements. However, both these explanations
can be ruled out by the following data. First, responses during
inaction condition are highly specific for a single task (either
execution or observation); this rules out the possibility that
they depend on reward-related processes, these being iden-
tical in both tasks. Second, the response during inaction con-
dition was more tightly linked with the no-go signal rather than
to the end of the trial, as one would expect if it were related to
reward delivery. Third, inaction response did not appear to be
the result of a global modulation of neuronal activity, typical
of unspecific phenomena (such as arousal); indeed, most of
simultaneously recorded grasping neurons did not respond
during inaction condition (see Figure S3). In addition, electro-
myogram (EMG) recordings (Figures 2E and 2F) showed
strong activity during action execution but not during all the
conditions (inaction and action observation) in which nomove-
ment was required (see also Supplemental Results), thus
demonstrating that monkeys did not move either during inac-
tion conditions in both tasks or during action observation.
Taken together, these data indicate that inaction coding is a
true functional property pertaining to specific sets of F5
neurons.
What is the relationship between the response of inaction
neurons to the action and inaction conditions in the same
task? Population responses to executed or observed actions
were clearly stronger than those during inaction in the corre-
sponding tasks. Furthermore, the average peak of activity
timing in the inaction condition was earlier than that in the ac-
tion condition, in both tasks (Figures 3A and 3E). Nevertheless,
neurons’ peak of activity timing (Figures 3B and 3F), peak firing
rate (Figures 3C and 3G), and average firing rate (Figures 3D
and 3H) during action and inaction in the same task werepositively and significantly correlated. These findings indicate
that the neurons’ response pattern underlying the representa-
tion of unperformed actions reflects the one associated with
overtly executed or observed actions.
Why should some F5 neurons discharge in the absence of
any executed or observed movement? One possibility might
be that inaction neurons have an inhibitory function. Thus,
the response during the inaction condition would contribute
to suppressing an action the agent is representing but is
required not to perform [5–7]. This explanation might be plau-
sible, however, only for a small portion of the recorded neurons
(n = 6), namely, those showing opposite (i.e., facilitated-sup-
pressed, or vice versa) activation pattern during action and
inaction conditions (see Figure S4). Sincemost of inaction neu-
rons showed instead the same activation pattern during the
action and inaction condition, a more plausible interpretation
is that they provide the monkey with an internal representation
of its own or another agent’s grasping, both when this repre-
sentation is associated with an overtly executed or an
observed action, and when it has to be intentionally withheld.
Accepting this interpretation, one should expect that
neuronal responses during the inaction condition of the execu-
tion task are specifically associated with an intentional deci-
sion to refrain from grasping, and not with a mere absence of
movement due, for instance, to the fact that the monkey ne-
glects the instruction. For example, during some action trials,
the monkey, despite the go signal, maintained fixation and
(incorrectly) held its hand on the starting position until the
end of the wait period (1.2 s; see Figure 1B). Although from a
behavioral point of view, these trials were identical to correctly
performed inaction trials, they were incorrect relative to the in-
struction cue; thus, the monkey was not rewarded (‘‘omitted
action’’). We analyzed neurons encoding inaction during task
execution recorded when the monkey, incorrectly, omitted to
act in at least five trials (n = 17). Then, we compared their
response during action, inaction, and omitted actions. Figure 4
shows that the population response associated with omitted
action (gray) is significantly weaker than that during both the
Figure 2. Single-Unit Examples and Population
Activity of Neurons Responding to Inaction in
Different Task Contexts
(A) Responses of two neurons in the action and
inaction conditions during task execution (left)
and observation (right). Each panel shows the
perievent raster plot (top) and the spike density
function (bottom) during the two conditions.
Neuron activity is aligned (dashed vertical lines)
on object presentation (Obj pres) and go/no-go
signal (go/no-go). Small triangles indicate cue
sound onset (green), reaching onset (orange),
and object-pulling onset (purple).
(B) Histogram showing task context selectivity of
all the neurons responding to inaction (n = 105).
Exe, neurons responding to inaction exclusively
during task execution; Obs, neurons responding
to inaction exclusively during task observation;
Exe>Obs, neurons responding more strongly
(p < 0.05) to inaction during task execution than
during observation; Obs>Exe, neurons respond-
ing more strongly to inaction during task obser-
vation than during execution; Exe=Obs, neurons
responding similarly (p > 0.05) to inaction in
both task contexts.
(C and D) Population responses during action
and inaction conditions in task execution (left)
and observation (right) of neurons encoding inac-
tion selectively in the context of task execution
(C) or observation (D). Note that only 10 out of
36 of the neurons shown in (C) but all of those
shown in (D) are mirror neurons. The red and
blue shaded regions around each curve repre-
sent 1 SE. Alignments are the same as in (A).
The median times of reaching onset and object-
pulling onset are indicated with the orange and
purple markers, respectively, above each population plot. Shaded areas around each marker represent the 25th and 75th percentile times of other events
of the same type.
(E and F) Average EMG traces from two muscles recorded during action and inaction conditions of one experimental session (45 correct trials for each
condition) in monkey M1 (E) and M2 (F). Note that both muscles were active only during the action condition of task execution, but not during either action
observation or inaction conditions in both task contexts (see Supplemental Results for details). Muscles are color coded, depending on the experimental
condition, as indicated in the insets between (E) and (F): EDC, extensor digitorum communis; Delt, deltoid. Other conventions are as in (C) and (D).
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1613action (blue; t = 2.14, p < 0.05) and inaction conditions (red; t =
4.08, p < 0.001), which in turn did not differ from each other
(t = 0.03, p = 0.98). Importantly, whereas the response during
the correct performance of the inaction condition was already
significant before the no-go signal (t = 3.54, p < 0.005), the
response to omitted actions started only after the go signal
(precue: t = 20.90, p = 0.38). Of course, although we can besure that the monkey intentionally refrained from acting during
correctly performed inaction trials, we cannot be sure of why
the omission occurred after the go signal. Considering that
omitted action trials were more frequent at the end of a
recording session, a likely possibility is that the monkey
needed a pause at a certain point of the task and ignored the
instructions. These considerations may justify why there isFigure 3. Functional Relationships between
Action and Inaction Coding
Relationship between action and inaction coding
in neurons selectively responding to inaction
during task observation (A–D; same neurons as
in Figure 2C) or task execution (E–H; same neu-
rons as in Figure 2D). Peak activity timing has
been calculated relative to the go/no-go signal
(sound off). All correlation coefficients reported
in the figure are significant with p < 0.001. The
dashed gray lines represent the function x = y
in each plot.
Figure 4. Neuronal Response during Omitted Actions
Population activity of neurons responding during inaction in the context of
task execution studied when the monkey erroneously omitted to act (gray
line). Other conventions are as in Figure 2.
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actions, but the lower discharge as compared to correctly
performed inaction trials supports the idea that inaction neu-
rons generate motor representations of grasping, which are
recruited both when the monkey acts and when it intentionally
refrains from doing so.
Previous studies have shown that motor representations
can be mentally rehearsed in the absence of any overt move-
ment, based solely on the sight of a moving stimulus usually
associated with the monkey’s ownmovement [8]. Our findings
demonstrate that ventral premotor neurons can code motor
representations even in the absence of any visual stimulus.
Furthermore, the tight link between action and inaction
responses in the context of task execution or observation sug-
gests that distinct classes of neurons are selectively recruited
to encode representations of self (task execution) and other’s
(task observation) action. Interestingly, a recent study demon-
strated that in the presupplementary motor area of the
macaque, which is tightly connected with area F5 [9, 10], there
are neurons encoding specifically self or others’ observed
action [11]. Although a no-go condition was not included in
this latter study, it is plausible that the interaction between
mesial and lateral premotor areas could enable to exploit
motor representations related to self and others’ action at a
more abstract, conceptual level: action concepts might be
crucial to understanding not only what we, or others, are do-
ing, but also what we, or others, are refraining from doing. In
other words, refraining from grasping an apple necessarily
requires the activation of a representation of grasping.
In line with our findings are some previous human event-
related potentials studies, in which subjects were required to
intentionally not do an action within a free-choice and an
instructed paradigm. The results showed that intentionally
refraining from performing an action evokes cortical activa-
tions similar to those associated with the overt execution of
that action [12], suggesting that even intending to not do
something activates a representation of what has to not be
done. Interestingly, similar results have also been reported
by fMRI studies in the domain of human language [13]. Indeed,
the representation of affirmative action-related sentences acti-
vated specific regions within the frontoparietal cortical action
representation system, and these regions were also activated,
although more weakly, when action-related sentences were
presented in negative terms.The present findings expand the notion that the motor
system is involved in high-order cognitive functions by
showing that representations of self and others’ action, at
the single-neuron level, are activated not only when an action
is overtly performed or observed but also, most interestingly,
when one needs to represent its negation.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes four figures, one table, Supplemental
Results, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found
with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.05.047.
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